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Abstract
The consequences of adopting other definitions of the concepts of sum
and convergence of a series are discussed in the light of historical and epis-
temological contexts. We show that some divergent series appearing in
the context of renormalization methods cannot be assigned finite values in
a form consistent with Hardy’s axioms without at the same time equating
one to zero, thus destroying the mathematical building. We show that
if the replacements for the concept of sum of a series are required to be
associative, to be invariant under finite permutations of the terms and di-
lution, further restrictions emerge. We finally discuss the epistemological
costs of accepting these practices in the name of instrumentalism.
Keywords: divergent series, Hardy, Cesaro, Feynman
1 Introduction
The possibility of assigning a finite value to divergent series has recently made it
to the news1 in a way that is unusual for science or mathematics news. Indeed,
this news and even some related Youtube videos seem to lie halfway between
joke and serious stuff, but in the end it turns out that these contributions are
intended (by their authors) to be serious.
It is then compelling to assess the scientific relevance of these methods and
in particular the issue of (logical) consistency of these methods in relation to the
body of mathematical knowledge, as well as their epistemological implications.
In Section 2 we display the mathematical background of the problem. Sec-
tion 3 contains the statement of the main results of this work along with their
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proofs. Further, we discuss historical and epistemological issues in Section 4
while Section 5 is devoted to conclusions.
2 Background on Series
2.1 Sum of a Series
We follow here standard textbooks [1, p. 383-4] reviewing the definition of series
and some of its basic properties, focusing on what will be relevant for the coming
Sections.
Consider a sequence {a0, a1, a2, · · · } and also its sequence of partial sums
SN =
N∑
k=0
ak. This sequence of partial sums is called an infinite series, or
simply series.
Definition 1. If there exists a number s such that s = limN→∞ SN we say that
the series
∞∑
k=0
ak is convergent with sum s and write
∞∑
k=0
ak = s. Otherwise, we
say that the series is divergent.
Wemay further distinguish among divergent series those where the limN→∞ SN
is +∞ or −∞ on the one hand (we may call them divergent to infinity) and those
where this limit does not exist.
Definition 2. A convergent series
∞∑
k=0
ak is called absolutely convergent if the
series
∞∑
k=0
|ak| is convergent. Otherwise, it is called conditionally convergent.
2.1.1 Basic Properties
We follow an approach inspired on the posthumous book by Hardy[7] on diver-
gent series. For convergent series, the following properties can be demonstrated
as theorems:
(A) For any real k,
∑
n
an = s⇒
∑
n
(kan) = ks.
(B)
∑
n
an = s and
∑
n
bn = r ⇒
∑
n
(an + bn) = s+ r.
(C)
∑
n=0
an = s⇔
∑
n=1
an = s− a0.
The proofs are a direct application of the properties of the limit of a sequence
(in this case the sequence of partial sums).
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Remark 1. Properties (A) and (B) are recognised as linearity and (C) is called
stability. They extend the natural properties of sums for the sequence of partial
sums SN all the way through the limit.
An immediate generalisation of (C) to finitely many operations is the fol-
lowing
Corollary 1. For any positive integer N ,
∑
n=0
an = s⇔
∑
n=N
an = s−
N−1∑
k=0
ak.
We list here other natural properties of convergent series extrapolated from
finite sums via the limit properties for the sequence of partial sums.
Corollary 2. (a) Associativity If the series
∑
n
an has a (finite or infinite)
sum, then the series
∑
k
bk obtained via bk = a2k + a2k+1 for some or all non-
negative integers k, has the same sum.
(b1) Commutativity If the series
∑
n
an has a (finite or infinite) sum then the
series
∑
n
bn obtained via (b2k, b2k+1) = P (a2k, a2k+1) = (a2k+1, a2k) for some
or all nonnegative integers k, has the same sum (P is the nontrivial permutation
of 2 elements).
(b2) For series having the commutativity property, finite compositions of per-
mutations of order up to N (where N a positive integer) do not alter the sum
of the series.
(c) Dilution If the series with elements a0, a1, a2, · · · has a (finite or infinite)
sum then the series with elements a0, 0, a1, 0, a2, 0, · · · i.e., inserting a zero be-
tween some or all pairs of elements in the original sequence, has the same sum.
Proof. For associativity, collecting up to N terms corresponds to picking a sub-
sequence from the original sequence of partial sums, having thus the same limit.
For (b1) every other partial sum coincides with the original ones. For (b2), the
partial sums of the new series coincides with the original one every N steps. In
between, they differ at most in a finite sum of terms that goes to zero for k →∞.
Hence, both sequences of partial sums have the same limit. As for dilution, if one
takes a convergent sequence {SN} and duplicates its terms: S1, S1, S2, S2, · · · ,
the new sequence has the same limit as the original one. Hence, dilution does
not alter the sum of the series.
The above properties can be arbitrarily (but finitely) combined, without
altering the sum of a series. However, more drastic rearrangements need not
preserve the sum unless the series is absolutely convergent. In fact, any rear-
rangement of an absolutely convergent series produces a new series with the
same sum as the original one. However, invariance in front of arbitrary rear-
rangements of terms does not hold for conditionally convergent series. This is
the content of Riemann rearrangement theorem [1, p. 413].
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Theorem (Riemann). Let σ(n) be an injective function of the positive integers
and K some real number. Suppose that {a1, a2, a3, · · · } is a sequence of real
numbers, and that
∑∞
n=1 an is conditionally convergent. Then there exists a
rearrangement σ(n) of the sequence such that
∑∞
n=1 aσ(n) = K. The sum can
also be rearranged to diverge to ±∞ or to fail to approach any limit.
Remark 2. A classical example of rearrangement is the alternating series an =
{
(−1)
n
n+1
}, n ≥ 1. This series sums to s = ln 2. Create a new series by
dilution adding one zero before each element of the series and dividing by 2,
i.e., {0, a1/2, 0, a2/2, · · · }. Combine then this series and the original one as in
property (B). The new series has sum s = 32 ln 2. However, after disregarding
the intermediate zeroes, the combined series is a rearrangement of the original
one, where the negative terms (for n = 2k) appear every third element instead
of every other element. The new series adds two positive numbers for every
negative contribution, thus subtracting the negative contributions in a different
way from that in the original series.
Remark 3. All conditionally convergent series can be decomposed into two
monotonic series: one with the positive terms, diverging to +∞ and another
with the negative terms, diverging to −∞. What Riemann’s Rearrangement
Theorem teaches us is that if one wishes to interpret the sum of such a series
pictorially as the outcome from “cancellation of both infinities”, then there is
actually not one way to do it, but infinitely many, depending of the order in
which the elements of the two participant series are picked up. However, each
possible result is the unique limit of a specific sequence of partial sums.
2.2 Signification
Mathematics can be regarded as a process of successive abstractions originating
in real-life situations. Thus, natural numbers abstract the process of counting
objects and involve the abstraction of the concept of addition as well. Instead
of saying: one goat and another goat makes two goats and another goat makes
three goats . . . and the same for all indivisible objects, we say 1 + 1 + 1 . . .
abstracting away all objects and dressing the final answer with them again
(I counted n goats). We increase our ability of counting moving to objects
with more elaborated properties (e.g., divisible objects or portions of objects,
debts, missing objects), producing the realms of integers, rationals, etc. The
properties of addition are extended (i.e., preserving its original properties) to
these higher levels of abstraction. The operations of abstraction and its inverse
dressing relate mathematics to the material world. We call them more precisely
abstraction and signification.
The process of abstraction is also known as idealization and in physics is
historically linked with Galileo Galilei and his discussion of free fall. [5, pp. 205]
(for an English translation see [6, pp. 170]) Insight on the process of signification
can also be traced back to Galileo’s words announcing that mathematics is the
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language of the universe [4], thus recognising mathematics as belonging to the
realm of the material world.
Hence, when addressing issues of the material world and its sciences, math-
ematical objects retain a specific signification. Any new mathematical object
introduced along the investigation is related by abstraction and signification on
one hand to the material world, on the other hand to mathematics where the
object becomes context independent by the very process of abstraction. Thus,
when counting apples we use the same addition than when we count goats,
nodes in a vibrating string or smiling faces. The reciprocally inverse processes
of abstraction and signification lie in the foundations of any attempt to under-
stand the material world with mathematical tools, and cannot be disrupted nor
neglected in any of its parts.
2.3 Minimal Requirements
Let us suppose that we want to resign Definitions 1 and 2 and produce another
definition related to the sequence {a0, a1, a2, · · · }. We require however to keep
as much as possible of the original properties of series summation. We raise
then properties (A-C) to the status of axioms, while replacing the series symbol
by something new, since that symbol received its meaning in Definition 1 which
we are now resigning. Inspired by Hardy in [7], we assume hereafter that axioms
(A-C) hold for the new object ≬
∑
n
an. Each new method of assigning values to
infinite sequences should provide its own definition (as well as signification) for
this object. Corollary 1 now reads: ≬
∑
n=0
an = s⇔ ≬
∑
n=N
an = s−
N−1∑
k=0
ak.
The last term of the RHS is the plain sum of a finite set of numbers.
We will distinguish those methods that sum convergent series and series
diverging to infinity in the usual way, namely,
Definition 3 ((see p. 10 in [7])). (a) A method2Y assigning a finite value to a
series is called regular if this value coincides with the standard sum in the case
of standard convergent series.
(b) A regular method Y is called totally regular if series diverging to ±∞ with
the standard definition also diverge to ±∞ in Y .
Axioms (A-C) may be regarded as a minimal compromise. Any method
which is not linear and stable cannot be seriously considered as an alternative
to the sum of a series (it would be either not linear or not finitely related
to ordinary sum). Also, in Hardy’s view regularity is a minimal requirement:
whichever method not complying with standard results for standard convergent
problems cannot be seriously considered as an extension of the concept of sum.
Already in Section 1.4 of Hardy’s book it is noted that the method E of analytic
extension to assign values for divergent series is not regular. We will comment
on this method in Subsection 3.3.
2The symbol Y is inspired in the Cyrillic word указ meaning decree or edict (formally:
imposition).
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3 Statement of Results
We state now the main results of this work:
Theorem 1. Any method Y assigning a finite number to ≬
∑
n
1 (proposed
replacement for 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + · · · ) is (i) not totally regular, (ii) not
regular and (iii) contradictory.
Theorem 2. Any method Y assigning a finite number to ≬
∑
n
n (proposed
replacement for 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + · · · ) is (i) not totally regular, (ii) not
regular and (iii) contradictory.
By contradictory we mean that incompatible statements corresponding to
r = Y ({an}) = s for different real numbers r and s can be proved in this
context.
It goes without saying that we are speaking about well-posed methods Y
where the assigned values for ≬
∑
n
an are unique, whenever the sequence belongs
to the domain of the method. Also, the definition of regularity naturally assumes
that the sequences associated to all convergent series belong to the domain of
whichever method Y is under consideration (even non-regular ones).
3.1 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. That the method Y is not totally regular is immediate
since otherwise it should assign the value +∞ to the proposed expression. By
(C), ≬
∑
n
1 ≡ Y ({1, 1, 1, · · · }) has the same value as 0+ 1+ 1+ 1+ · · · (namely
Y ({0, 1, 1, · · · })) and hence the term-wise difference of both objects by (B) sat-
isfies: 1 + 0 + 0 + 0 + · · · ≡ Y ({1, 0, 0, 0, · · · }) = 0. Since 1 + 0 + 0 + 0 + · · · is
a convergent series with sum 1 with the standard definition, we conclude that
the method Y is not regular. As for contradiction, using (A) we obtain in the
same way: −1 + 0 + 0 + 0 + · · · ≡ Y ({−1, 0, 0, 0, · · · }) = 0 thus establishing by
(C) that 1 = Y ({0, 0, 0, 0, · · · }) = −1 since both those numbers can be assigned
as value for 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 + · · · , which by (C) belongs to the domain of the
method Y . This result is contradictory with the whole body of mathematics
since obviously 1 6= −1.
Proof of Theorem 2. That the method Y is not totally regular is immediate
since otherwise it should assign the value +∞ to the proposed expression. As
for regularity and consistency, we will prove that Y ({1, 1, 1, 1, · · · }) belongs to
the domain of Y and compute its value. Let s be the value of 1+2+3+4+5+· · · ,
i.e., Y ({1, 2, 3, 4, · · · }) = s. Then by (C), Y ({0, 1, 2, 3, 4, · · · }) = s+ 0 = s and
also by (A), Y ({−0,−1,−2,−3,−4, · · ·}) = −s. Hence, we obtain by (B):
1+ 1+ 1+1+ · · · ≡ Y ({1, 1, 1, · · · }) = 0. Hence, this expression belongs to the
domain of the method Y having the value zero and the previous theorem applies.
Moreover, repeated application of (C) on 1+1+1+1+· · · ≡ Y ({1, 1, 1, · · · }) = 0,
results in 1+1+1+1+ · · · ≡ Y ({1, 1, 1, · · · }) = −N for any nonnegative integer
N . This result provides an alternative proof of contradiction in Theorem 1.
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3.2 Associativity, Commutativity and Dilution
Let us now consider ≬
∑
n=0(−1)
n. Any method assigning a value s to it should
comply s = 1− s and hence s = 1/2. There exist many totally regular methods
for the purpose, the most famous of which is probably the Cesaro sum, defined
as the limit of the the sequence of successive averages of partial sums, i.e., letting
Zn = (
1
n
)
∑n−1
k=0 Sk for n ≥ 1, (being Sk the partial sum of the first consecutive
elements of the original series up to k) we have Zn = (12 ) + (
c
n
), where c = 0 or
1 and the Cesaro sum of ≬
∑
n=0(−1)
n is limn→∞ Zn = 1/2.
Lemma 1. Cesaro sums fulfill none of the properties associativity, commuta-
tivity and dilution.
Proof. For associativity just note that summing the elements of ≬
∑
n=0(−1)
n
pairwise we obtain either 0+0+0+ · · · or 1+0+0+ · · · (starting the association
in the first or in the second element of the original series), both having different
Cesaro sums and both different from 1/2. For commutativity, permute the
elements (an, an+1) for all odd n, obtaining 1 + 1− 1− 1 + 1 + 1− 1− 1 + · · ·
whose Cesaro sum is unity. For dilution, insert one zero only after each positive
element, obtaining the Cesaro sum 2/3.
Lemma 2. Any commutative method Y assigning a (finite) value to ≬
∑
n=0(−1)
n
is contradictory.
Proof. Whichever commutative method Y is adopted, (C) forces ≬
∑
n=0(−1)
n =
r = 1 − r and hence r = 1/2. However, by permuting the elements pairwise,
from ≬
∑
n=0(−1)
n ≡ Y ({1,−1, 1,−1, · · · }) = r we obtain ≬
∑
n=0(−1)
n+1 ≡
Y ({−1, 1,−1, 1, · · · }) = r. Also, the first expression by (A) and multiplication
by −1 leads to ≬
∑
n=0(−1)
n+1 ≡ Y ({−1, 1,−1, 1, · · · }) = −r. We obtain the
contradiction r = Y ({−1, 1,−1, 1, · · · }) = −r with r = 1/2.
3.3 Euler’s Continuation Method E [7]
In Hardy’s account of possible alternatives to standard summation, Abel’s method
and Euler’s continuation method E are highlighted [7, p. 7] (among others). We
may say that Euler glimpsed a possible approach in a moment in history where
the concept of convergence was not fully developed (see next Section) while Abel
formulated the idea with exhaustive precision. In fact, Abel’s second theorem
[16, p. 3] can be stated as:
Theorem (Abel). If
∑
n
an = s and lim
x→1−
∑
n
anx
n = S, then s = S.
In other words, if the series is convergent, with finite sum s, and if the power
series has a (finite) limit S, then both numbers coincide.
Hardy’s account of E is that if
∑
n
anz
n defines an analytic function f(z)
in some region of the complex plane such that the function is properly defined
along a path from that region up to z = 1, then
∑
n
an = f(1). E is indeed less
precise than Abel’s theorem. Let us consider in which ways the assumptions of
7
Abel’s theorem may fail in the context of E. Either {an} is a divergent series
or limz→1
∑
n
anz
n does not exist (now with z ∈ C).
For the first case, there are examples of power series having exactly the
same shape in different regions of the complex plane, while defining different
functions. Then there is no uniquely defined “f(z0)”. For an example with the
functions f(z) = ±
1 + z2
1− z2
and z0 = 2i see [7, p.16]. Another example could
be the geometric series for f(z) = (1 − z)−1 contrasting the series inspired in
Riemann’s zeta function: g(z) =
∑
n≥1 n
1−z . Both series have disjoint domains
of convergence in the complex plane. For z = 1 both series -in the context of ≬
∑
or Y ()- could be taken to represent 1 + 1 + 1 + 1+ · · · but the second function
gives a finite number while the first diverges.
For the second case, Sierpinski [15] gives an example of a convergent series∑
n
an and a power series derived from it (defining a function f(z)) such that
while the power series has a limit for x→ 1− along the real axis (fully compatible
with Abel’s theorem), the limit does not exist along arbitrary paths z → 1 in
the complex plane. This has more than anecdotic value, since Sierpinski series
combined with E could be used to “destroy convergence” in any convergent series.
Let r =
∑
n
an be the sum of Sierpinski’s series. Let
∑
n
bn be a convergent
series and consider the expressions r−r+
∑
n
bn and f(z)−r+
∑
n
bnz
n. Using
Abel’s method, both expressions have the same value, namely
∑
n
bn. Using E,
the first expression still yields the same value, while the second one diverges.
Clearly, E cannot be used as a tool in this context without further and
accurate specification. On the contrary, following Borel [16] we may say that
Abel’s approach is exhaustive and there is no room for improvement. Different
attempts to prove the converse of Abel’s theorem after adding adequate addi-
tional hypotheses, have originated the branch of mathematics called Tauberian
theorems.
4 Discussion
4.1 Historical Digression
Extending on Hardy’s account, it is to be noted that the modern concept of
limit was established by Cauchy around 1821. However, he could not solve the
question of uniform convergence. In fact, it is said [10] that this issue worried
Cauchy to the point of never publishing the second volume of his course of
analysis, nor consenting to a reedition of the first. He eventually allowed the
publication of the lecture notes of his classes by his friend and student Moigno in
1840[11]. Again according to Lakatos, the distinction between point convergence
and uniform convergence was unraveled by Seidel in 1847[10], thus completing
the approach of Cauchy. The modern way of regarding limits and convergence
could be said to originate around 1847.
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4.2 Epistemological Issues
The idea of substituting a definition with another one is not free from conse-
quences. Definitions in mathematics may look arbitrary at a first glance but
they are always motivated. Fundamentally, (a) they satisfy the need of filling
a vacancy of content in critical places where precision is needed (however, since
many textbooks present definitions without discussing the process for producing
them, the epistemological requirements remain usually obscure) and (b) they
are explicitly forbidden to be contradictory or logically inconsistent with the
previously existing body of mathematics on which they rest. In addition, when
dealing with the mathematisation of natural sciences, definitions carry a signi-
fication, which is the support for using that particular piece of mathematics in
that particular science.
While we appreciate the exploration work around concepts that has been
done over the years, we do not substitute a meaningful and established concept
with something that is inequivalent to it in the common domain of application.
Again, when understanding natural sciences, such substitution would disrupt
the signification chain. In simple words, we do not replace a meaningful content
with a meaningless one. This would be to depart from rationality, something
that is positively rejected by mathematics as a whole as well as by science in
general and by a large part of society.
Along the presentation, we cared to put limits to the possible relation be-
tween Y (·) and ordinary sums. In the light of the proven Theorems, it is verified
that such relation is feeble or absent. Hence, the very inspirational root of these
techniques becomes divorced from its results and effects. As stated above, the
alternative of resigning one of axioms (A-C) also destroys any possible relation
to ordinary sums.
Replacements that assign ≬
∑
n = a or ≬
∑
1 = b (with a, b real numbers)
destroy the basis of mathematics, making it the same to have one goat that
having a million goats. We must emphasize that regularity is a necessary con-
dition to preserve signification but it is not sufficient. Whatever replacement
we attempt must provide a rationale for the method, preserving signification
within mathematics (in the chain of abstractions it belongs) and in relation to
natural sciences. For the case of series, signification is further destroyed along
with properties such as association, permutation and dilution. The alternative
of using one or another definition depending of the matter under study simply
destroys the role mathematics as a whole. Instead of having eternal and pure re-
lations accessible by reason alone [13], it will turn mathematics to be dependent
of the context of use.
4.2.1 The Epistemology of Success
The issue of assigning a finite value to divergent series with methods that are
not regular and are contradictory under Hardy’s axioms is not only material of
newspaper notes, discussion blogs or Youtube videos. It has actually reached
the surface of society from stuff published as scientific material. We support
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this statement by commenting on a couple of references. This issue is not just
a feature of these two citations, but the standard procedure of a community:
just read the references in [2] to find a large amount of practitioners of this
community.
In [12] we encounter an attempt to justify the use of the Riemann’s Zeta
function. The authors refer to Hardy’s book for the actual method. They use
axioms A and B and the zeta function to write equality between
∑∞
n=1 n and
−1/12 (see their eq. (2.20)). The conclusion is evident: the method does not
comply with Hardy’s axioms. Furthermore, the result is false since to reach their
conclusion the authors disregard a divergent contribution. Hence, the equal sign
does not relate identical quantities as it should. The correct expression would
be
≬
∑∞
n=1
n ≡ Y ({1, 2, 3, 4, · · · }) = −
1
12
(1)
where Y must be understood as the method based on Riemann’s Zeta function.
Here, Theorem 2 applies.
Our second example, concerning Theorem 1, is the book [2] where on page
167 we read “The analytic continuation method converts a manifestly infinite
series into a finite result” exemplifying with ≬
∑∞
n=1 1 ≡ Y ({1, 1, 1, · · · }) = 1/2
(our notation, the authors use standard series notation) using the same proce-
dure as [12]. On p. 165 this expression was given the value −1/2, probably a
typo. Needless to say, the authors do not use the symbol Y but they refer to the
method as a “formal procedure” which leaves the matter in the ambiguities of
language. If by formal we read belonging to or constituting the form or essence
of a thing, we strongly disagree, since essence is the result of an abstracting
(usually analytic) procedure [8]. However, if “formal” is intended as in its sec-
ond accepted meaning: following or according with established form, custom, or
rule, we agree, observing that such social agreements are not a part of science.
In defense of such procedures it is usually said that the theories using them
are among the most precise and successful in Physics. This argumentation
claims, then, that questions of unicity of results, backward compatibility of
a method with standard convergent series, or its relation to sums (let alone
signification) are uninteresting. The value is assigned because in such a way one
obtains the “correct” result. Hence they adhere to a (false) epistemology that
Dirac called instrumentalism [9, page 185] and we plainly call the epistemology
of success.
Hitting (what is claimed to be) the right answer is not equivalent to using
the right method. One may hit a correct answer with a wrong method just
by chance, by misunderstanding, or even by adaptation to the known answer,
etc. Paraphrasing Feyerabend’s everything goes: an idea may be welcome as a
starting point without deeper considerations (within ethical limits, of course).
However, for that idea to be called scientific it has to comply with the scientific
method. Moreover, it has to comply with rationality. The attitude described by
something is right because it gives the correct answer is dangerous in many levels.
The mathematical attitude is actually the opposite (and logically inequivalent
to it): If it gives the wrong answer, either the assumptions or the method in
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use are incorrect[14]. This holds also for natural sciences, where in addition we
have, through signification, a safe and independent method to distinguish wrong
answers from right answers. Note that independency is crucial. Natural science
makes predictions that can be tested independently of the theory involved. If
verified, they give continued support to the theory, while if refuted they indicate
where and why to correct it. As a contrast, a theory making predictions that
can only be tested within itself obtains at best internal support for being consis-
tent, but it never speaks about Nature since predictions are not independently
testable. In any case, having the right answer is not a certificate of correctness
(there may be an error somewhere else) whereas having any wrong answer is a
certificate of incorrectness (the error is “there”).
It is worth to keep in mind the attitude taken by the founding fathers of
Quantum Electrodynamics
The shell game that we play [...] is technically called ’renormaliza-
tion’. But no matter how clever the word, it is still what I would call
a dippy process! Having to resort to such hocus-pocus has prevented
us from proving that the theory of quantum electrodynamics is math-
ematically self-consistent. It’s surprising that the theory still hasn’t
been proved self-consistent one way or the other by now; I suspect
that renormalization is not mathematically legitimate. Richard
Feynman, 1985[3]
I must say that I am very dissatisfied with the situation, because this
so called good theory does involve neglecting infinities which appear
in its equations, neglecting them in an arbitrary way. This is just
not sensible mathematics. Sensible mathematics involves neglecting
a quantity when it turns out to be small - not neglecting it just
because it is infinitely great and you do not want it! Paul Dirac.
[9, page 195]
5 Concluding Remarks
Definitions are not arbitrary, any extension of an established operation (such
as addition) needs to preserve the properties of the operation when applied to
objects in the original domain of definition (regularity). We have shown in this
sense that some methods proposed as extensions for the sum of convergent series
(standard definition) fail on this regard. An important example of this failure
is the method based on Riemann’s Zeta function that has been associated to
renormalization procedures in some branches of physics. Moreover, regularity is
not enough, the extension needs to preserve all the mathematical building-blocks
it rests on.
It is important to indicate that attempts to justify renormalization such
as [12] ought to be considered scientific attempts on the ground of Popper’s
demarcationism[14] since by connecting to mathematical subjects as the problem
of infinite series they offer the rationale behind their procedures of scientific
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enquire. The result of the examination indicates that such replacements must
be rejected.
The decision to expose the issues concerning the mathematical foundations of
these matters to the general public should also be commented. The understand-
ing of scientific matters is not reserved to an elite of practitioners that guard
the “truth” of the subject as priests of a cult. Opening science to the scrutiny of
the general public, including scientists outside the paradigm is simply correct,
as discussed by Lakatos [10].
The following thesis should be considered: the more than 50 years that this
matter has stayed without resolution is a demonstration that in closed elitist
communities the interest of (return for) the community may very well have
priority over the public (humane) interest.
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